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ABSTRACT 
 
An Empirical Examination of the Role of Characteristics of the Format, Standard Setting 
Alliance and Alliance Partners in the Market Acceptance of Formats. (August 2008) 
Sujan Mathew Dan, B.Tech., Kerala University; M.S, Texas A&M University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Alina Sorescu 
          Dr. Rajan Varadarajan 
 
New product introductions rely on technologies that are often subject to strongly 
contested standards wars. In an attempt to ensure that the technical formats that their 
products are built upon, are the ones that gain widespread market acceptance and thereby 
emerge as industry standards, firms often engage in alliances to develop and/or market 
these technical formats. This research examines the relationships between the 
characteristics of standard setting alliances, those of the alliance partners, the technical 
formats and the market acceptance of the formats. In doing so, I seek to complement 
prior research by developing and empirically testing a theoretical framework of these 
relationships. While a few studies (Axelrod et al. 1995; Chiao, Lerner and Tirole 2007) 
have examined how firms form and organize standard setting alliances, the relationship 
between the characteristics of such alliances and their success (i.e., the market’s 
acceptance of the technical format supported by the alliance) is an under-researched 
subject.  
A format that is widely accepted by the market (adopted in more products and 
adopted by more firms) is in turn more likely to emerge as a standard. Using a unique 
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data set of formats and standard setting alliances in the consumer electronics industry, 
assembled from multiple sources, I examine this link between standard setting alliances 
and format characteristics, and the market’s acceptance of the format.  
 Results indicate that the relationship between the size of a standard setting 
alliance (number of partners in alliance) and the market acceptance of a format is 
inverted U-shaped. This suggests that a larger membership in the development alliance 
does not always imply that the alliance activities will lead to market acceptance of the 
format. I find that alliances with a greater proportion of generalists are shown to be 
capable of developing formats that find greater acceptance in the market. Marketing 
intensity in the years prior to forming the alliance is found to be important. The results 
also suggest that the broader the applicability of a technical format across industries, the 
greater its market acceptance. Interestingly though, the hypothesis that formalized 
alliances lead to greater market acceptance of the format was not supported by the data.  
 I conclude with a discussion of the potential contributions and implications of the 
findings for marketing practice and future research. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In many product categories, the presence of network externalities requires that 
the technical specifications of the core technologies that products rely upon are 
standardized.  A standardized technology implies that products from different 
manufacturers, and very often, competitors, are able to seamlessly integrate with one 
another, thereby increasing the value offered to both the firms participating in the 
network and to the end customers. In such markets, prior to a specification being settled 
upon, very often, there is competition between the specifications that the competing 
firms or alliances of firms have developed.  
 Which technical specifications are to be adhered to by producers is determined 
either by market forces, or by alliances established with the purpose of developing and 
establishing a standard in a given technical domain (Axelrod et al. 1995; Shapiro and 
Varian 1999).   Specifically, in many instances, the increasing emphasis on compatibility 
and inter-operability of multiple technologies within a product and between products 
leads to firms forming alliances which have come to be known as standard setting 
alliances (These have also been referred to as consortia and committees in economics). 
That is, alliances formed with the purpose of developing and establishing industry 
standards. 
 
 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Marketing. 
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 Such alliances, which I will refer to as standard setting alliances (Axelrod et al. 1995), 
are formed with the purpose of developing technical specifications referred to as 
formats, promoting them within the industry and eventually establishing them as the 
commonly accepted set of technical specifications referred to as standards.  
Consider, for instance, the competition between the Betamax format introduced 
by Sony in 1975 and the VHS format introduced by JVC in 1976 in the market for video 
cassette players. The success of the winning format - VHS, can be attributed, at least in 
part, to the alliances that Matsushita formed with other Japanese producers of video 
cassette players. Correspondingly, despite Sony managing to convince RCA to stop 
development of a similar technology, it’s reluctance to license its technology to other 
manufacturers helped JVC and its parent Matsushita to gain market acceptance for its 
format (Cusumano, Mylonadis and Rosenbloom 1992).  
Thirty years later, a similar battle was waged between the HD-DVD and Blu-ray 
formats, until Blu-ray pulled ahead in the race and became the de facto standard. This 
time however, the rivalry was between two standard setting alliances, namely the DVD 
Forum and the Blu-Ray Disc Association. Another recent example is the competition 
between various DVD formats in the mid-nineties where Sony and Philips teamed up 
with downstream content providers such as Time Warner and competitors like Toshiba 
to develop and promote the new DVD technology (Shapiro and Varian 1999). While the 
high definition DVD war is better known because it has received a lot of recent press 
coverage, many other such standard wars between standard setting alliances are common 
across product categories.   
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A plausible explanation for this marked shift from competition between firms to 
competition between alliances of firms could be that when firms involved in the 
development of a technology are at par in terms of resources and capabilities, and when 
the quality and performance of the technologies developed by these firms are 
comparable, markets may be indifferent to a choice of technology. In such cases, where 
network effects are strong, industry alliances are formed with the goal of garnering 
support from various downstream and upstream players in the market.  
The question of which format is likely to emerge as a standard in a standards war 
is obviously an interesting one, both for firms within an industry and for the end 
consumers. Despite the important role of standard setting alliances in the standard setting 
process and the vast amount of literature on standards, there has however been very little 
empirical research in marketing, economics and management science that addresses the 
issue of what kind of standard setting alliances and formats are more likely to develop 
and promote a standard that attracts other industry players, complementors, competitors 
and a sizable customer base to gain their acceptance and to eventually command a larger 
portion of the market share in order to establish the format as the industry standard 
(Chiao, Lerner and Tirole 2007).  
Most research that has addressed optimal methods of developing and promoting a 
format to establish it as a standard has primarily looked at this relationship either using 
case studies or using theoretical lenses. While a subset of these papers have looked at the 
strategies that standard setting alliances utilize to achieve their goals (e.g., Weiss and 
Sirbu 1990; Chiao, Lerner and Tirole 2007), other than theoretical work by Axelrod et 
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al. 1995, we know little about how a firm decides on what standard setting alliance to 
join. The questions that  address the strategic choices faced by firms, namely the those of 
what firms to attract into an alliance, what kinds of formats to promote and what kind of 
alliances to join, have therefore by and large gone unaddressed. The primary goal of this 
dissertation is to address this gap. A more detailed discussion of prior work is presented 
in Chapter II.  
The primary reason that the aforementioned gap exists within the marketing, 
management science and economics literature is the lack of available data, and the lack 
of clarity with regards to alliance participation. It has however been shown that when 
multiple incompatible technologies compete in network markets, the initial 
characteristics of the network can be predictive of the outcome1 (e.g. Farrell and Saloner 
1985; Katz and Shapiro 1986; Farrell and Saloner1988). The initial characteristics of 
standard setting alliances are well documented and observable.  Given that, these initial 
characteristics of the network can predict the outcome, and that these characteristics are 
observable, this dissertation focuses primarily on the initial characteristics of the alliance 
and the format in predicting the market outcome in the form of acceptance by the 
market.   
To summarize, the primary goal of this dissertation is to gain an understanding of 
the role of the initial characteristics of the alliance and of the firms involved in the 
alliance, and the format in the acceptance of the format by the market. Specifically, it 
addresses the following issues: 
                                                 
1 Outcome of a network has been equated to sales, growth of direct and indirect network size etc. of users 
and a system of compatible and often complementary products.  
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The association between 
1) The initial characteristics of the standard setting alliance and the market 
acceptance of the format. 
2) The characteristics of the partners in the initial alliance and the market 
acceptance of the format.,  And 
3) The characteristics of format and its market acceptance.  
 I utilize network theory and the resource based view, to argue that contrary to 
Axelrod et al (1995), the participation of a larger number of firms in the initial alliance 
exhibits decreasing returns to participation in standard setting alliances. I also seek to 
clarify relationships that have mixed, or even contradictory conclusions in previous 
research, such as the effect of age of a technology on its success and that of the effect of 
formalized alliances on alliance performance. Also, while the impact of the initial 
characteristics of the network on the outcome of the network has been theoretically 
demonstrated using normative models, this dissertation, to my knowledge, is the first to 
provide some supporting empirical evidence. 
 By using a unique dataset of formats, and measure of the market’s acceptance of 
the format, this dissertation contributes to the rich stream of research on standards and 
standard setting alliances. While the marketing has a rich tradition of studying new 
product alliances (e.g. Wuyts, Stremersch and Dutta 2004; Rindfleisch and Moorman 
2001), it has not extensively studied multi-firm alliances or alliances in the context of 
standard setting. This dissertation looks at both these substantive areas.  
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 The next chapter discusses the background to the problem in greater detail, 
presents the conceptual definitions and a theoretical framework that describes the effect 
of the variables of interest on the market acceptance of a format. Following this, I 
present the hypotheses and conceptual support for these, describe the data and model 
used in the study, and present the results. I conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of the findings of the study for marketing practice and future research.  
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND, DEFINITIONS AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
 
BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS 
Formats and Standards 
 While the concept of standards has been around since Biblical times, where the 
lack of an established language standard led to the disruption of the construction of the 
tower of Babel (Shapiro 2001), their relevance in the marketplace and our everyday lives 
has undergone quite a bit of evolution. The numerous standards that have influenced our 
existence range from the U.S Constitution’s requirements for an established system of 
weights and measures, the U.S Navy’s requirements for standardized diameters for bolts, 
nuts, and screw threads, but only at Navy yards, to the case of varying railroad widths or 
gauges in the early 19th century. History shows that the lack of standards could even lead 
to tragic consequences, as was the case with the Baltimore fire in 1904, when firefighters 
called in from a neighboring city were unable to use their equipment on the Baltimore 
fire hydrants because of the differing diameters of the fire hoses (Nesmith 1985).  
As firms move to an environment where the importance of information 
technology, electronics and other networked industries grow, we have also concurrently 
witnessed the emergence of an alternate type of standard. Such standards are prevalent in 
product categories where compatibility and interoperability are critical to both products 
and their complements. For instance, fax machines can connect to one another because 
they obey a common protocol, computers can connect to one another because they 
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operate by rules set by standardized hardware and software. At a larger scale, email is 
made possible by virtue of numerous computers utilizing various pre-determined 
technical specifications, known as formats and obeying established rules and policies 
(Shapiro 2001).   
Technical specifications that refer to a given technology, referred to as formats 
are evaluated (often in competition with other specifications) by both the market and the 
institutions and firms operating in the industry. The focus of this dissertation is on 
formats of this nature. Departing somewhat from prior research, I note that prior to the 
emergence of a single industry standard, competition occurs between formats, the 
outcome of which is the establishment of a standard. While prior literature on standards 
(e.g. Farrell and Saloner 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1986; Axelrod et al. 1995; Farrell and 
Saloner 2001) has not made this distinction, this differentiation is important for the 
purposes of this dissertation.  
When formats compete in markets where there are increasing returns to the 
number and size of the firms that adopt the same core product and process design 
features (Axelrod et al. 1995), and where compatibility with other formats is an 
important requirement, either the market or the firms participating in the market decide 
upon a standard which emerges as the winner from among the formats under 
consideration (Farrell and Saloner 1988; Shapiro and Varian 1999). In competitive 
settings where the components of a product are made by different manufacturers, firms 
developing and selling complementary components are just as much relevant to a firm’s 
choice of competitive strategy, as are the firm’s competitors, suppliers and customers 
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(Katz and Shapiro 1994; Shapiro and Varian 1999)2. It must however also be noted here 
that a winning standard may not always emerge from either of the two processes 
described, or in certain product categories the market may make it possible for multiple 
standards to co-exist. In other words, in such instances, more than one format can exist 
simultaneously in the market. Therefore, rather than observe the emergence of a single 
industry standard, it is appropriate to look at the formats that are able to command a 
larger share of the market.  
Based on the preceding discussion, I define a format as a (set of) technical 
specification(s) for a core product component that allows the product to connect or 
communicate with other products or systems. Multiple formats may exist in markets 
prior to the emergence of a specification that is accepted by the market. A standard is a 
format that has gained acceptance in a market, either through adoption by consumers or 
through approval by a body of experts.  
It is also important to separate this work from prior related conceptualizations 
(e.g., Anderson and Tushman 1990; Besen and Farrell 1994; Katz and Shapiro 1986; 
Schilling 1998) which have used the terms ‘formats’ and the ensuing ‘standard’ 
interchangeably with the term ‘dominant design’. This research follows the terminology 
outlined in Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy (2006), who state that standards (and 
preceding formats) are distinctly different from dominant designs (e.g. Abernathy and 
Utterback 1978; Suarez and Utterback 1995).  First, dominant designs can encompass 
multiple formats, which can co-exist in the market without one of them emerging as a 
                                                 
2 This has also, in some cases been termed as systems competition. 
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standard. Second, while standards emerge as an outcome of standard setting activities as 
well as market forces, dominant designs emerge as an outcome of market forces only. It 
must however be noted that in many cases, the terms dominant design and standards can 
be used interchangeably. For example, in the much publicized high definition DVD 
standards battle, both Blu-Ray and HD-DVD competed to become the dominant design. 
However, each of them is capable of playing multiple formats ranging from the CD-
ROM, CD-R formats, Mini Disc, DVD-R formats, DVD+R formats in addition to the 
Blu ray specific formats (BD-R and BD-RE) and the corresponding HD DVD (HD 
DVD-R and HD DVD-RAM).  
The earlier discussion on systems competition, in light of the compatibility and 
interoperability requirements highlights the importance of collaborative relationships. 
Such an approach implies that firms must focus not only on competition and end users, 
but also on collaborators. The Literature on network markets suggests that in markets 
with strong network effects, first-mover advantages do not necessarily have to be 
decisive, and victory in such markets often requires entering alliances with other firms to 
strengthen the networks (Shapiro and Varian 1999). In markets with strong network 
externalities, consumers place a high value on the compatibility of products and 
technologies. Given that there are benefits to being the commonly accepted specification 
in the market, standardization becomes all the more important to firms, and it is in a 
firm’s best interest to actively be involved in developing and/or promoting a format by 
entering into licensing agreements with the alliance that controls the format.   
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Standard Setting Alliances 
Standards may emerge as an outcome of a De Jure mode of standardization, 
where either a privately controlled standardizing body or a regulatory body decides what 
the standard should be (Farrell and Saloner 1986). In the absence of a De Jure 
standardization process, the standard is determined by means of a De Facto process, 
wherein the market determines the standard. Participation in De Jure processes can be 
either by promoting one’s own format or joining an alliance to promote the preferred 
standard.  From a manufacturer’s perspective, the drawback of the De Facto mode of 
standardization is that the firms involved have little control over the market’s choice of 
standards. The De Facto standard could however be one that is not compatible with the 
firm’s technology, and hence may put the firm at a competitive disadvantage by locking 
it out of the market (Schilling 1998).  
Unofficial, fast-acting standard setting and promotional private standard setting 
alliances that participate in De jure processes are a more recent phenomenon beginning 
in the late 1980s (Weiss and Cargill 1982). These private alliances were preceded by 
more formal standard setting organizations such as ANSI (American National Standards 
Institute), ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) and the IEEE 
(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers). In the late 1980s though, firms 
increasingly began to view the standard setting organizations as slow to act on fast 
emerging technologies, and not equitably representing the interests of all firms 
(consortiuminfo.org 2007).  
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The consequence of the slowing down of the standardization process and the 
growing understanding that firms could use the right collaborative relationships, 
promotions and the market to arrive at a favorable outcome for themselves was that a 
number of private standard setting alliances were formed to create a standard to address 
a single commercial need. The primary purpose of these alliances was to agree upon, 
develop and promote a technical standard and put together a large installed base of 
producers, complement firms and users (David and Greenstein 1990; Axelrod et al. 
1995). Participating in such alliances or assembling allies, could at one time almost be 
certain to lead to an established standard. For example, the VHS format video cassette 
player was able to gain market acceptance due to Matsushita Corp.’s willingness to 
license its technology to other Japanese firms and indirectly partnering with video stores.  
The changing nature of the standard setting process and particularly the 
increasing emphasis on standard setting alliances has been attributed, primarily to two 
factors. First, while several firms may possess most of the technical and market 
capabilities that are needed to set the standard individually, no single firm may possess 
the capability to build a large enough network of users to ensure the format’s market 
acceptance (Farrell and Saloner 1986). Besen and Johnson (1986) attribute this failure to 
the heterogeneous preferences of other firms and users within the industry, and the 
firm’s limited knowledge of these preferences. This in turn, causes firms to look towards 
alliances or other firms to assist in building up a large network. Second, the absence of a 
clearly dominant player, and the presence of several strong firms, may cause smaller 
firms to offer their support to as many competing alliances as possible (Saloner 1990). 
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The alliance that develops the format may also offer licenses at low or zero costs to 
encourage adopter firms to adopt the particular format (Farrell and Gallini 1988). These, 
in turn, have led to multiple formats that perform the same task to emerge and compete 
in certain industries. Therefore, even in the presence of a De Jure standard setting 
process, the market continues to play some role in choosing among formats, accepting 
the format and eventually establishing a standard.  
The conceptualization of a format in this dissertation, takes these into account, 
and implies that a standard, if it emerges from the competition, is an outcome of both De 
Facto and De Jure processes. In the absence of a clear standard such as in the case of 
VHS and Beta, more than one format can exist side by side; oftentimes serving similar 
market segments such as was the case with the Blu-ray and HD-DVD formats. In such 
cases, the degree to which a given format is accepted or adopted by firms in an industry, 
and the number of products in which a given format is utilized serves as a better measure 
of success.  
Standard setting alliances are therefore essentially multi-firm partnerships 
formed with either 1) the purpose of developing and supporting a technical format in the 
marketplace, such as the Kodak, Intel and Adobe alliance to develop the Kodak Picture 
CD, or 2) the purpose of supporting more than one format through time, and hence 
setting multiple standards such as the CF card and memory stick which were developed 
by the compact flash association. Therefore, standard setting alliances can be anything 
from an informal partnership of firms to a more structurally organized body built to 
perform regular standard setting and format promoting tasks, and involved in a range of 
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activities, including sharing information, engaging in active product design, negotiating 
compromises, testing for compliance, performance (Farrell and Saloner 1988) and even 
branding.   
Standard setting alliances tend to be dynamic organizations whose membership 
may change over time. The initial members of the standard setting alliance tend to be 
active participants in the day to day functioning of the alliance and remain involved in 
the development, design and improvement processes. Over the course of time, other 
members, often referred to as adopters3 are added to the alliance. These firms are less 
active members of the alliance but they receive license rights over the format’s technical 
specifications which permit the use of the format in their products (consortiuminfo.org 
2007). The initial alliance members, therefore primarily play the role of a) promoting the 
creation of new markets, or bringing new technology into an existing market, such as 
high definition televisions and b) spreading costs of R&D across the partners.  
As discussed earlier, the scope of this research is restricted to the initial alliance 
members, which are the promoters that founded a standard setting alliance with the 
stated purpose of developing and promoting a given format. These firms are more likely 
to be the main decision makers in the alliance, and also to be more closely involved in 
the development and promotion of the format. 
                                                 
3 The adopter firms  are occasionally invited to join the governing body (such as the 20 member strong 
steering committee in the DVD Forum, not all of whom were part of the developers) and may have a role 
in some of the standard setting alliance’s major decisions. Adopters are essentially firms that join the 
alliance in order to be able to influence the future of the format, receive early knowledge about future 
developments, and have the opportunity to interact with industry leaders (consortiuminfo.org).   
 
 15
LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
Prior work that has specifically examined the standard setting alliances includes 
analytical (e.g. Axelrod et al. 1995; Economides and Skrzypacz 2003; Farrell and 
Saloner 1988; Lerner and Tirole 2004), conceptual (e.g. Weiss and Cargill 1992; Funk 
and Methe 2001) and descriptive papers (e.g. David and Shurmer 1996; Dranove and 
Gandal 2004; Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy 2002). However, with few exceptions such 
as the work of Chiao, Lerner and Tirole (2007), which uses a combination of analytical 
and empirical methods, there is a dearth of theoretically grounded empirical research that 
examines the outcome of standard setting alliances.  
Axelrod et al. (1995) develop an analytical model for how firms form alliances to 
develop and sponsor technical standards, but do not account for the success of the 
standard. Further, their framework is based on the assumptions that the utility for the 
firm joining a particular standard setting alliance increases with the size of the alliance 
and decreases with the presence of rivals in the alliance. I do not impose such 
restrictions in this research. Chiao, Lerner and Tirole (2007), empirically examined the 
workings of the standard setting organizations, from a mix of both the traditional view-
point of formal Standard Setting Organizations4 such as the ANSI and private standard 
setting organizations. While they examine policies governing disclosure and licensing of 
intellectual properties of these organizations, I look at the market outcome of standard 
setting alliances, independently organized by firms.  
                                                 
4 Traditional standard setting organizations are fast being replaced by private standard setting 
organizations as the default mode of standardization (consortium info.org 2007; Axelrod et.al 1995). 
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To my knowledge, this research is the first attempt at trying to understand the 
impact of the initial characteristics of standard setting alliances, members and of the 
format on the market outcome of a format. Table 2.1 presents a more detailed review of 
prior work examining the relationship between alliances and standards, and Table 2.2 
positions this research in relation to other related work. 
In Chapter III, I present the conceptual model, hypotheses and supporting 
arguments.
 TABLE 2.1 
Relationship between Consortia/Alliances and Format Success/Standards: A Review of Representative Literature  
 
Paper Issue(s) studied Data & Methodology Major Findings and Limitations 
Rosenkopf, Metiu and George (2001)  
How do interactions between mid-level 
managers in technical committees 
facilitate subsequent alliance 
formation? 
Cellular Industry: Communications 
Standards Review (Trade pub) and 
SDC, LEXIS/NEXIS and Compustat 
Random effects negative binomial 
regression. 
The effect of joint technical committee 
(TC) participation on alliance formation 
decreases as firms have more prior 
alliances, suggesting that TCs provide a 
more critical avenue for knowledge 
exchange when firms do not have the 
luxury of exchanging information 
through contractual linkages. 
Correspondingly, Joint CTO 
(Cooperative Technical Organizations) 
participation increases alliance 
formation at a diminishing rate. 
Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett 
and Bruderer (1995)  
How business firms form alliances to 
develop and sponsor technical 
standards? 
 
Analytical 
 
Predicted alliance configurations are 
only for a Nash equilibrium. No single 
firm has an incentive to switch to 
another alliance. 
Assumes that the utility of a firm joining 
a particular standard setting alliance 
increases with the size of the alliance 
and decreases with the presence of rivals 
in the alliance. 
Limited to nine firms in the UNIX 
industry 
Farrell and Saloner (1988) 
Examines three common methods for 
achieving coordination: 1) explicit 
communication and negotiation before 
irrevocable choices are made, 2) no 
explicit communication and succeeds if 
one agent chooses first and the others 
follow (simple form of market 
leadership/bandwagon), 3) a hybrid 
allowing both communication and 
unilateral preemptive actions. 
Analytical 
Although the committee is slower, it 
outperforms the market mechanism. The 
unilateral and committee mechanisms 
were analyzed together and subsequent 
analyses of the hybrid mechanism shows 
that unilateral actions improve the 
committee system. 
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 TABLE 2.1 (Continued) 
 
 
 
Paper Issue(s) studied Data & Methodology Major Findings and Limitations 
Chiao, Lerner & Tirole (2007)  
Investigates the relationship between 
SSO (Standard Setting Organization) 
characteristics and their policies 
governing disclosure and licensing of 
intellectual properties (patents). 
Game theory, ordered logit regression 
sample- consortiuminfo.org, and other 
lists (see paper pg 15) 
Negative relationship between SSO 
orientation to technology sponsors and 
concession level required by the sponsor 
and positive relationship between 
sponsor ‘friendliness’ of the selected 
SSO and quality standard. 
 
Keil (2002) Analyses the strategic logic of standardization alliances Case study 
In establishing a standard, there is a 
tradeoff between speed of standards 
development and standard penetration in 
the marketplace. 
Increased size of SIGs (Special Interest 
Groups) slowed the process 
 
Lemley (2002)  
 
Standardization and assignment of IP 
rights 
 
Case studies and survey of standard 
setting rules and bylaws. 
Members of standard setting 
organizations (SSO) contract to bargain 
from an inefficiently powerful set of 
property rules to a regime where 
intellectual property (IP) rights are 
removed or are licensed in advance on 
standardized firms, SSO IP rules are 
hence a partial market solution to 
excessive IP protection 
18
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TABLE 2.2 
 
Positioning of Research Reported in Relation to Prior Research 
 
Article 
Key predictor 
variable 
(where applicable) 
Outcome 
variable 
(where applicable) 
Alliance  
outcomes 
examined 
Format 
characteristics 
examined 
Market 
outcome 
examined 
Methodology 
 
Rosenkopf et 
al. (2001) 
 
Technical committee 
participation 
Alliance formation 
 
X 
 X NA 
Empirical 
 
 
Farrell and 
Saloner (1988 
 
Speed, efficacy and 
payoffs of choosing 
standards 
Best form of 
choosing a standard 
 
X X NA 
Theoretical/ 
Analytical 
 
Chiao et al. 
(2006) 
 
Standard setting 
organization 
characteristics 
Policies governing 
disclosure and 
licensing of IP 
X X NA 
Analytical/ 
Empirical 
 
Lemley (2002) 
 NA NA 
IP rights 
assignment X X 
Observational/ 
Case Studies 
 
Axelrod et al. 
(1995) 
 
Alliance size and 
competitor involvement 
Alliance 
configurations 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
NA 
Theoretical/ 
Analytical 
 
Keil (2002), 
Funk and 
Methe (2001) 
etc. 
NA NA 
Emergence of 
a standard 
 
X X 
Case Study 
(sample=1) 
 
This study 
 
Alliance, partner and 
format characteristics 
Market acceptance of 
a format 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
Empirical 
 
 
 
 
 20
CHAPTER III  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 Figure 3.1 presents a conceptual model delineating the relationship between 
standard setting alliance, partner and format characteristics and the market acceptance of 
format.  
 
FIGURE 3.1 
Relationship between Characteristics of the Format, Standard Setting Alliance and 
Alliance Partners and the Markets Acceptance of the Format5 
 
                                                 
Format Characteristics 
Characteristics of  
Standard Setting Alliance  
& Alliance Partners 
Size (H1) 
Composition (H2) 
Type (H3) 
Marketing Intensity (H4) 
Market 
Acceptance of 
Format 
5 While the emergence of a single standard is indicated for the purpose of a more complete conceptual 
model, the outcome variable in this research is restricted to the market acceptance of the format.  
Format Age 
Standard 
Breadth of Format Application 
(H5) 
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SIZE OF THE STANDARD SETTING ALLIANCE 
Prior research has shown that firms enter into alliances with the aim of 
minimizing transaction costs, cope with environmental uncertainty and reduce 
dependence on resources outside their control (Das and Teng 2000). The eventual 
performance of such alliances is however conditional upon choosing appropriate 
partners, alliance design, and being able to adapt the nature of the alliance to achieve the 
desired end results (Ireland, Hitt and Vaidyanath 2002), such as develop proprietary 
software, manage decisions on licensing to adopters, manage improvements in the 
format, etc.  
 In addition to financial gains, the purpose of entering a standard setting alliance, 
is to take into account the direct and indirect network externalities that arise as a result of 
being part of the right network, and to combine the resources of the partners (Das and 
Teng 1998), and to combine them in a manner such that the resources brought in to the 
alliance are complementary to one another (Parkhe 1991). Direct network externalities 
are the externalities that occur "through a direct physical effect of the number of 
purchasers (or users) on the quality of the product." Indirect network externalities 
“involve instances that lack that direct physical effect; for example, software being more 
plentiful and lower in price as the number of computer users increases” (Liebowitz and 
Margolis 1994).  
 Having a large network of users and firms producing complementary goods is 
crucial for creating sufficient network externalities that enable a technology to succeed. 
Having too few members in the alliance is therefore indicative that the format may not 
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be able to gather hard to access resources and complementarities and take advantage of 
the network externalities required to get the technology off the ground. While some 
formats have been developed and promoted by smaller alliances, and in some instances, 
by even a single firm6, the downside to having too few members in an alliance is that the 
format runs in to the danger of not getting sufficient resources and or the support of a 
network to popularize it in the market (Axelrod et al. 1995).  
Standard setting alliances can vary from a dyad to partnerships involving more 
than two partners. The primary goal of the standard setting alliance is to develop and 
subsequently commercialize a given format, thereby often calling for resources that are 
varied ranging from technological to market resources. Das and Teng (2000a) have 
argued that alliances are “optimal resource configuration tools” and that sustained 
resource heterogeneity arising from a diversity of partners is a source of competitive 
advantage. By this argument, as more members join the alliance, unique resources and/or 
capabilities are being brought in, and each member participates and makes unique 
contributions in either the upstream (developmental stages) and/or the downstream 
(commercialization) of the format.  
Prior research has identified that technology, marketing skills (knowledge of 
local markets in the case of international alliances), management competence (Chi 1994) 
and financial, physical and managerial resources (Das and Teng 1998) are the commonly 
identified sets of resources that firms bring to an alliance. Though it is recognized that 
strategic alliances are a ‘balance between cooperation and competition’ (Luo, 
                                                 
6 Farrell and Saloner (1986) show that only dominant firms, which exert substantial market power, are able 
to single handedly and successfully develop and commercialize a technology.  
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Rindfleisch and Tse 2007; Luo, Slotegraaf and Pan 2006; Das and Teng 2000b), in cases 
where competitors are involved in an alliance, the corresponding resources possessed by 
the competitors are likely to overlap (especially since R&D and market access are 
critical roles performed by standard setting alliances).   
Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001), have also shown that horizontal alliances 
(alliances between competitors), have lower levels of relational embeddedness 
(reciprocity and closeness among alliance participants) and higher levels of knowledge 
redundancy (degree of overlap in the knowledge base between alliance members). 
Hence, both from the resource based view perspective and from the strength of ties 
perspective, I argue that beyond a certain point, resource heterogeneity can be difficult to 
sustain when more competitors begin to join the alliance, particularly at the development 
phase.  
Further, the role and importance of trust impacting firm performance (e.g. 
Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay 1996; Mohr and Spekman 1994), and control (e.g. Parkhe 
1993; Dyer 1997) are well documented. Alliances between competitors are shown to be 
especially plagued by a lack of trust between partners (Khanna, Gulati and Nohria 1998) 
and hence result in coordination issues. This consequently raises the risk of voluntary 
information disclosure or involuntary knowledge dissemination through informal 
networks of employees (von Hippel 1987), which gets magnified with more partners 
being involved in the alliance, all vying for control of the spoils of the outcome. Besen 
and Johnson (1986) have shown that when there is a lack of coordination between firms 
and users, as argued above, market adoption of technologies suffers. Luo, Rindfleisch 
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and Tse (2007) also argue that a larger number of competitor alliances may also 
negatively affect firm performance by enhancing a competitor’s ability to copy its 
partner firm’s technological capability and marketing tactics.  
Therefore, there is quite a bit of evidence that as competitors get involved in 
alliances, performance is negatively affected. This is also argued for by Brock (1975) 
who finds that competitive rivalry between firms negatively affects standardization in 
the computer industry.  
 In sum, beyond certain number of alliance partners, I propose that the standard 
setting alliance is likely to exhibit diminishing returns. Hence, the following hypothesis: 
  H1: The relationship between the number of participants in the initial standard 
setting alliance supporting and promoting the format and market acceptance of the 
format will be inverted U-shaped.  
 
COMPOSITION OF THE STANDARD SETTING ALLIANCE 
 Prior research has shown that both the number and type of products and/or the 
resources used by a firm has an impact on a firm’s profits and/or survival in the industry. 
Teece (1982) argues that firms leverage valuable resources (which they use to enter new 
markets), across multiple markets to gain scale and scope economies. Organizational 
ecologists also argue along similar lines that firms with a broader scope are able to adjust 
better to changing environmental conditions (e.g. Hannan and Freeman 1977; Sorenson 
et al. 2006). Hannan and Freeman (1977) placed firms along a continuum, with their 
position determined by the combinations of resource types and levels in which the firm 
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can survive. This position was termed as the organizational niche, and along the 
continuum, firms can be classified as specialists or generalists. Specialists are firms that 
can survive within a limited range of resources, whereas generalist firms have the ability 
to gather a wider range of resources, and survive in a variety of environments (Sorenson 
et al. 2006). Operationally, specialists and generalists have been differentiated based on 
the breadth of the markets in which they operate (Freeman and Hannan 1983; Sorenson 
et al. 2006).  
 In the context of product strategy, the position along the specialist-generalist 
continuum (referred to also as scope) has been shown to have influence on both firm 
performance and strategy. For example, Robinson and Fornell (1985) and Kekre and 
Srinivasan (1990), show that broader product lines lead to significant market share 
benefits and increases firm profitability. In addition, Schmalensee (1978) shows that 
firms with broader product lines can erect entry barriers to new market entrants; and 
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) demonstrate that multiple products reduce competition 
through mutual forbearance in multiple markets, and numerous studies have provided 
evidence for mutual forbearance when firms compete in multiple markets (Jayachandran, 
Gimeno and Varadarajan 1999). Sorenson (2000) demonstrates that the number of 
products offered by a firm has a negative and significant effect on market exit.  
 In the context of this dissertation I follow the new product and product portfolio 
literature and I define generalist firms as those involved in the development and 
commercialization of multiple formats or a broader format line, as evidenced by their 
participation in multiple standard setting alliances. Specialists, on the other hand, are 
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involved in the development and commercialization of one or at most few formats or a 
narrow format line, as evidenced by their involvement in fewer standard setting 
alliances.   
 I argue that alliances with a greater proportion of generalists (as compared to 
alliances with a greater proportion of specialists), by virtue of having a higher proportion 
of firms involved in the development of multiple formats, have access to more unique 
resources and capabilities from their various partners, and are able to use their broad 
alliance involvement to increase market share and mutual forbearance. Such alliances 
will have in effect also have a greater ability to push for compatibility and 
interoperability of other formats that they have been involved in, or are involved in. In 
other words, such alliances are able to leverage their involvement and experience in 
other alliances to develop formats that are more likely to be accepted by the market. I 
therefore expect that as evidenced by literature on product breadth, alliances with a 
greater proportion of generalists are likely to find greater acceptance in the market.   
However, previous literature has produced divergent streams of thought relating 
to product breadth and focus.  Lancaster (1990), in a review of the literature on optimum 
product variety (a term he equates to “models” in the consumer durables market), in 
which he examined multi product firms argued that firms’ choice of product variety is 
influenced by a) the existence of inter-product economies on the production side, b) 
potential for increasing demand by offering greater variety and c) the use of product 
variety for strategic purposes. While the second point does not apply directly to this 
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situation, the first and third points have direct bearing on my argument that formats 
developed and promoted by generalist alliances are likely to be successful.  
First, the argument about inter-product economies suggests that when there are 
economies to be gained from being involved in a network, firms are able to learn from 
one alliance and use this knowledge across other alliances they are involved in or in 
other formats. Also, being involved in the development of multiple formats enables 
firms to be influential in determining the characteristics of other technologies they are 
involved in, there by contributing to positive indirect externalities.  
 Second, the market that formats operate in is a networked one. Network theory 
literature (e.g., Katz and Shapiro 1986; Farrell and Saloner 1986) suggests that there are 
strategic benefits to being part of a larger network. In networked markets, the long run 
success of the firm is determined by the network size (Schilling 2002) and resource 
access (Besen and Farrell 1994). Generalist firms and alliances are far more likely to 
have access to more varied resources, and also to provide the much needed connectivity 
that is essential to the development and success of formats. Hence, I argue that being a 
generalist in network markets presents greater and more unique advantages in terms of 
inter-product (format) economies and ensuring interoperability between formats and 
products, the importance of which has already been discussed. Hence, the following 
hypothesis:  
 H2: Formats developed and promoted by a standard setting alliance with a 
greater proportion of generalists will gain greater market acceptance compared to 
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formats developed and promoted by a standard setting alliance with a greater 
proportion of specialists. 
 
STANDARD SETTING ALLIANCE TYPE  
A major outcome of the movement from official standard setting organizations 
such as IEEE, ETSI and ANSI to private standard setting alliances such as the compact 
flash association and the DVD forum was that the alliance did not need to be a 
permanent part of the firms involved in the development of the format. Two broad 
categories of standard setting alliances can be identified.  
First, some formats tend to be developed within formalized alliances, whose 
stated and formally recorded purpose is to develop and establish multiple standards 
collaboratively or to promote formats developed by individual members over a period of 
time. These alliances have a formalized structure and a committee that oversees the 
workings of the alliance, and make decisions on such topics such as formats to be 
supported and alliance membership. These alliances have a much broader focus in terms 
of what they wish to achieve and tend to exist for longer periods, and have also been 
referred to as ecosystem SSOs (standard setting organizations) (consortiuminfo.org 
2007).  
Other formats are developed in informal alliances whose purpose is to develop a 
single format and possibly establish it as an industry standard. These alliances tend to be 
short-lived and their purpose tends to be very narrow. Such alliances are often times 
formed in order to enable a new market to address an isolated functional need in a 
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product category. They are also formed when immediate action is required for 
developing or making improvements to a format. Occasionally, such alliances may 
remain active for longer periods of time when the original intent for forming the alliance 
was to limit the participation to a few firms; but in such situations, the alliance is limited 
to making improvements in the existing technical specifications. I refer to the former 
type of alliance as a formal standard setting alliance, and to the latter as an informal 
standard setting alliance. 
The existence of a formalized alliance structures has been found to better capture 
and apply know-how (Sivadas and Dwyer 2001; Kale, Dyer and Singh 2002). In 
addition, relative to an informal and transactional system for access to resources, an 
alliance based system enables a firm to minimize relational and performance risks (Das 
and Teng 1998), reduce transaction costs and better manage the transfer of resources, 
especially when they are diverse and complementary in nature.  
 Makhija and Ganesh (1997) also note that formal control systems can exist 
within alliances that allow predictable, regular and involved explicit information 
transfers. In the absence of formalized controls in an alliance or when the controls are 
informal, information transfer tends to be uncertain, ambiguous and embedded within a 
particular firm, owing to a multitude of factors that could range from lack of trust to 
transfer knowledge and skills between firms (e.g. Das and Teng 1998; Inkpen and 
Currall 1998), control issues (Blodgett 1992), or a lack of attachment between partners 
especially in newer alliances (Seabright, Levinthal and Fichman 1992).  
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 Given that alliances are usually entered in to with the objectives of accessing a 
common and otherwise inaccessible resource pool among others, I argue that having a 
formal alliance structure enables firms to better perform these activities that are crucial 
to new product development, minus the risks of transferring proprietary knowledge and 
instabilities associated with bargaining power in alliances (Inkpen 2001), especially 
when they are asymmetric in nature. Hence, the following hypothesis: 
 H3: Formats developed and promoted by a formal standard setting alliance will 
gain greater market acceptance compared to formats developed and promoted by an 
informal standard setting alliance. 
 
MARKETING INTENSITY 
Marketing intensity of the standard setting alliance refers to the average 
marketing expenditure of the members as a proportion of their assets.   
Dutta, Narasimhan and Rajiv (1999), examining marketing capability in high-
technology markets, state that firm performance in such markets has generally been 
attributed to external market factors such as its ability to ward off competitors. In 
addition, innovative performance has been attributed to the R&D and manufacturing 
investments, inter industry appropriability and opportunity conditions. They 
subsequently argue for and demonstrate that marketing capability is in fact necessary in 
high-technology markets. While the unit of analysis in the Dutta et al. study is the firm, I 
look at the importance of marketing at the alliance level, and at the early stage of the 
alliance.  
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A characteristic of network markets is that they are “winner take all” markets 
(Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy 2006; Schilling 2002) where the market support 
garnered at the early stages of competition can be critical in choosing the winner (Besen 
and Farrell 1994; Srinivasan et al. 2006), which in this case is a format accepted by the 
market, as an outcome of the combination of market and organizational forces. Thus, in 
such markets, the ability of the initial members in an alliance dedicated to the 
development and the promotion of a format is of great importance to the eventual 
success of a format and its ultimate emergence as a standard.  
In technology intensive markets, innovative firms which have developed a new 
technology are likely to look for ways to promote it and help it take-off in the market 
(Dutta and Weiss 1997).  Having a system of supporting products and supporters is 
therefore just as important as the role and quality of the format (Katz and Shapiro 1994; 
Shapiro and Varian 1999) in its market acceptance.  This is evidenced in alliances such 
as the HomeGrid Forum where innovative but smaller firms such as Infineon seeking the 
support of larger firms such as Texas Instruments, Panasonic and Intel to help promote 
their technology. Similarly, when Sony participates in a standard setting alliance with 
SanDisk to develop a memory format to be included in its products, advertisements for 
the product include mentions to the format as well, thereby providing more legitimacy in 
the market.  
This therefore implies that in addition to the technical resources to develop the 
product, firms involved in standard setting alliances also seek access to substantial and 
varied market based resources in order to ensure successful commercialization of the 
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developed format.  Alliance with stronger marketing capabilities is better able to identify 
customer segments and product categories that require certain types of technologies, and 
hence develop better technologies and formats that more specifically address these. 
Therefore, such firms are able to develop formats that have greater potential in the 
market, and are therefore able to better differentiate themselves on the dimensions of 
direct and indirect network externalities, which have been argued for in earlier sections.  
Schilling (2002) and Katz and Shapiro (1994), for instance, describe the role of 
advertising and other marketing activities in improving customer expectations and 
preventing technologies from failing. Chakravarti and Xie (2006), taking a behavioral 
approach, provide further evidence of the role of marketing and more specifically 
advertising in determining the outcome of standards wars. They provide evidence for the 
benefits of comparative advertising as opposed to absolute advertising. These once again 
point to the importance of marketing capabilities in establishing a standard.  
Dutta and Weiss (1997) also argue that the transfer of tacit knowledge is less 
likely in marketing partnerships than in joint ventures or licensing agreements. Hence, 
technologically innovative firms will tend to have a higher number of marketing 
agreements, since they may be able to protect their knowledge from competitors in the 
alliance. While Dutta and Weiss do not find support for this proposition, I argue that, in 
the case of early stage alliances, the support of firms with significant marketing and 
advertising expenditures is critical to the success of a format. I argue that innovative 
firms are likely to seek out firms that have marketing capabilities in an effort to earn the 
acceptance of the market. In the case of early stage standard setting alliances, it is 
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therefore not just the initial set of developers, but also adopters who are interested in 
accessing a wider user network. A wider user network would be in turn associated with a 
firm with strong marketing capabilities.  
Firms that have spent sufficient resources in marketing and advertising activities 
may find it easier to build a larger network of both partners and users. When the format 
first emerges, potential adopters will have little information on its quality and the 
likelihood that it will gain wide market acceptance.  Hence, potential adopters are likely 
to make decisions about the format they may consider licensing based on characteristics 
of the initial set of firms and the likely size of the user network, which research has 
shown is often used as a proxy for quality (Gatignon and Robertson 1985; Hellofs and 
Jacobson 1999). Promoters, on the other hand, hope for irreversible bandwagon effects 
(Wade 1995) to set in at some point wherein more adopters would join the alliance, thus 
encouraging more customers and supporters to join the network. For example, in June 
2007, when the Wibree forum7, a newly formed alliance led by Nokia opted to merge 
with the Bluetooth SIG (www.bluetooth.com), the Wibree forum in essence accessed an 
installed user base and an 8000 member strong network of manufacturers.  
These arguments point to the possibility that in markets for technologies, market 
resources could be an important factor in determining their success, especially in 
determining early success.  Hence, I argue that in the early stage of the standard setting 
alliance, while R&D intensity of promoter firms is important, the market resources it 
                                                 
7 Wibree is a new interoperable radio technology for small devices. It can be built into products such as 
watches, wireless keyboards, gaming and sports sensors, which can then connect to host devices such as 
mobile phones and personal computers. The forum classifies is as the missing link between small devices 
and mobile devices/ personal computers. (http://www.wibree.com/ 2007). 
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manages to assemble and hence the support it manages to garner both in terms of a user 
network and complements may be more important than R&D capabilities in determining 
the ultimate success of the format and to get the bandwagon effects to set in. Hence, the 
following hypothesis: 
 H4: Formats developed and promoted by a standard setting alliance with greater 
marketing intensity will gain greater market acceptance.  
 
BREADTH OF FORMAT APPLICATION 
 Formats are evaluated not just on their quality, but also on their breadth of 
applicability in the market and in other product categories. Breadth of format application 
refers to the number of product categories that a format is implemented in.  For instance, 
consider the necessity for data transfer between products. While both USB and Firewire 
formats transfer data, the USB found more applicability in different product categories. 
The Firewire has become extremely popular in digital video cameras, primarily because 
of the high rates of data transfer it is capable of. Alternatively, the USB has become 
popular because of its breadth of applicability and the number of products that over the 
years since introduction have adopted it over the Firewire format.  
The strategic consequences of having a large and stable installed user base of 
consumers and firms that implement the format in their product are well researched in 
the literature (e.g. Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003; Katz and Shapiro 1986). 
Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that the size of the installed customer base is a 
key success factor in markets with network externalities. For example, the Windows 
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operating system (Microsoft), personal computer architecture (IBM), VHS video cassette 
player (Matsushita), and Palm operating system (3Com) were successful because of their 
ability to expand the size of their respective networks much faster than their closest 
rivals [Macintosh (Apple Computers), Betamax video cassette player (Sony) and 
Windows CE (Microsoft), respectively]. Given the winner takes all nature of electronics 
markets where network effects are prevalent, an early lead in convincing manufacturers 
to adopt a particular format ensures a long term competitive advantage (Arthur 1989). 
As more product manufacturers adopt and implement the format, it serves as a surrogate 
variable for product quality (Gatignon and Robertson 1985; Hellofs and Jacobson 1999).  
Certain formats, by virtue of their applicability, are used in more than one 
product category. As certain formats that exhibit the characteristics necessary for 
broader application get implemented in multiple product categories, the format 
contributes to the indirect externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and 1986) of each of 
those products. Indirect network externalities involve instances that lack direct physical 
effect, such as when complementary products become more available as users of the 
primary product increase (Liebowitz and Margolis 1994).   
 For late movers, in addition to early movers having captured a larger installed 
base (Arthur 1989), there is also the switching cost or the added cost of making 
accommodations for alternate formats. However, there is sufficient evidence to show 
that inferior technologies are replaced by newer, more superior technology. Hence, the 
following hypothesis: 
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 H5: The greater the breadth of format application across product categories, the 
greater the market acceptance of the format.  
As the time since a format has been available (format age) increases, there is a 
greater possibility of it being used in more products and having built a larger installed 
base (Wade, Greenstein and Barth 2006). This could be either because it has been 
developed by manufacturers that are active in a particular product category (e.g. media 
formats developed by Sony to be implemented in products such as digital cameras and 
video cameras), or because they have been endorsed by national or regional bodies (e.g. 
television broadcast formats such as the NTSC and PAL systems). Such products, 
therefore, quite possibly, also have externalities that reduce the rate at which their 
installed base declines after sales have ceased (Wade, Greenstein and Barth 2006). These 
arguments present a case for older technologies finding a stronger installed base in the 
product category.  
Another stream of literature on product sales argues that with time, firms tend to 
fall behind in terms of technological sophistication, and correspondingly, the sales of the 
older products fall behind, leaving only the technologically innovative products 
(Requena-Silvente and Walker 2005; Bayus 1998, Stavins 1996) or products offered by 
firms with strong brands and large market share (de Figueiredo and Kyle 2006) to 
survive. Alternatively, firms switch to newer technology to ensure the survival of their 
products. This argues for the strong possibility that older technology may be replaced by 
newer technology in products.  
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In light of the above, since arguments in support of a positive association and a 
negative association between format age and market acceptance of the format are 
equivocal, I treat this as an empirical issue of interest, but do not hypothesize a specific 
relationship.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
DATA  
Empirical Context 
The empirical context for this study is the consumer electronics industry. 
Researchers in marketing have studied this industry in the context of diffusion (e.g. 
Goldenberg, Libai and Muller 2002; Bayus 1993) and channel management (e.g. Frazier 
and Lassar 1996). The consumer electronics association (CEA) has estimated the total 
sales of consumer electronics to top $158.4 billion by 2008, a growth of over 60% since 
2000. The consumer electronics industry, characterized by a high rate of growth and 
continuous streams of innovation, provides an appropriate empirical context given the 
large number of standard setting alliances.  
 
Sampling Procedure 
The population of interest is all the formats in the consumer electronics industry. 
Based on the definitions of formats and standards used in this paper, the sample was 
narrowed to only formats that exhibited the characteristics of exhibiting connectivity or 
communication with other systems or products. The product categories available on the 
review pages of CNET.com, a consumer electronics review source, were examined and 
the following eight product categories were initially chosen for inclusion in the study: 
camcorders, cell phones, digital cameras, DVD players, PDAs, GPS systems, Digital TV 
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and wireless systems (wireless routers and cards). However, four of these product 
categories were dropped following a number of missing values being observed and the 
reviews being incomplete. The categories eventually included in the analysis were 
PDA’s, digital cameras, camcorders and cell phones.  
A PhP8 script was developed to collect data from the product review pages on 
CNET.com. The data collected included manufacturer, part number, first review date 
(used as a proxy for the introduction date), high and low prices and the formats utilized 
in the products. For the products listed on CNET which did not have review dates we 
retrieved these dates from epinions.com, a website which aggregates electronics reviews 
from various sources. Table 4.1, provides a summary of the penetration and installed 
base of these categories (Consumer Electronics Association).  
 
TABLE 4.1 
Penetration and Installed Base for Product Categories Analyzed 
Product Penetration Installed base (million) 
Cell phone  78% 181.8 
Camcorder 43% 52.5 
Digital camera 57% 88.6% 
PDA 15% 21.6% 
 
 
For the products that had incomplete data on CNET, I sought to retrieve the 
missing data from individual product homepages or from specialized review sources 
                                                 
8 Recursive acronym for PhP hypertext processor.  
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such as Digital Photography Review for digital cameras. Data on the firms that 
developed a format and the alliance participants was collected from Factiva business 
news and information. Searches were first conducted for the format and if known at the 
time, the name of the alliance. The results were examined for date of publication and for 
the firms involved in the development. The results were triangulated after a set of cross 
checks with other results for consistency in the content and to arrive at the final list of 
original developers.  To ensure accuracy the dates of publication were examined to 
ensure that they were within a week (at most) of each other. Whenever available, the 
homepage of the standard setting alliance was used to confirm the list of original 
participants in the development alliance. Some formats had to be dropped from the 
analysis either because they could not be accurately tracked to their developers or 
because information was unavailable.  
 Firm level data on the firms involved in the alliance were collected primarily 
from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database and supplemented with data from the 
Thomson Financial DATASTREAM database. For foreign firms (not traded in the U.S), 
this data was collected exclusively from DATASTREAM, and the values converted to 
U.S Dollars using the averaged exchange rates for the year of alliance announcement.  
The product data (1399 observations) was aggregated at the product-year level to 
be used in the analyses, which yielded 464 observations at the category-format-year 
level from 69 unique formats across the four product categories. Fourteen of these 
formats were developed by alliances consisting of privately held firms or research 
agencies, on which firm level data was unavailable. These observations were therefore 
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dropped. The final sample consists of 364 observations at the category-format-year level 
on 55 unique formats. Table 4.2 presents a summary of the data.  
 
TABLE 4.2  
Data Summary 
 Split of Products in the Product Data  
Summarized at the 
category-format- year 
level 
Product category No. of Products 
No. of 
Formats Year Span No. of observations 
Digital camera 588 23 1999-2006 117 
Cell phone 490 21 2001-2006 77 
Camcorder 225 31 2001-2006 112 
PDA 96 19 2001-2006 58 
Total 1399   364 
 
 
MODEL 
Model Specification 
In order to appropriately measure the market’s acceptance of a technical format, 
one would ideally need data with a panel structure, wherein the dependent variables 
measuring market acceptance (market share) of a format are calculated across product 
categories and years. The benefit of developing such a panel structure where formats 
were observed across multiple years is that it allows controlling for format specific 
heterogeneity (Baltagi 2005; Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis 2005).The data used in this 
research allows for such a panel structure, albeit unbalanced. 
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As suggested by Wooldridge (2002), I perform a Hausman test to choose 
between random and fixed effects models. To run the test, I estimate both the fixed 
effects and random effects models and compare the saved coefficients from each to test 
that the random effects estimators are no different from the consistent fixed effects 
estimators. Based on the test, I continue with a random effects model.  
I consider the possibility that formats that are developed by a larger alliance 
and/or utilized in a greater breadth of products are likely to survive longer. In a 
combination of these possibilities one could argue that a larger alliance is likely to keep 
developing the format technology, and hence result in a format that lasts longer.  
Therefore, as recommended by (Wooldridge 2002), I perform a Hausman test (Hausman 
1978) to test for the endogeneity of the variable “format age.” I first run a reduced form 
model with all exogenous variables on format age. The residuals from this are saved, 
subsequently included in the main equation with market acceptance as the dependent 
variable, and significance of the residual tested. This indicated that the variable “format 
age” is endogenous and is treated as such.  
Next, I consider any potential for autocorrelation in my data. The Baltagi-Wu 
statistic (Baltagi and Wu 1999) has been shown to be better in cases on unequally spaced 
panel data, such as the case in my dataset as compared to the more traditional Bhargava 
et al modified Durbin-Watson statistic. Though exact critical values are not available in 
the literature (Kogel 2004), a Baltagi-Wu statistic of 1.93 indicates that autocorrelation 
is likely not a disruptive factor in the estimation of the model.  
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The presence of an endogenous covariate in the regression calls for an 
instrumental variable that is exogenous to the equation (uncorrelated with the error term) 
and is partially correlated with the endogenous variable (Wooldridge 2002), and a 
theoretically logical substitute for the variable in question.  Given that appropriate 
instrumental variables are notoriously difficult to obtain, and given the limited number 
of appropriate candidates available that are excluded from my model9, I use the 
Hausman-Taylor model that derives an asymptotically efficient instrumental variable 
estimator (Hausman and Taylor 1981). Using this model, also allows the latent 
individual effect to be correlated with both the time variant and invariant variables. OLS 
and GLS estimates are biased and inconsistent under such circumstances.  
Consider a random effects model of the form 
Yit= β1X1it +β2X2it+ δ1Z1i+ δ2Z2i+μi+εit      (1) 
Where  
‘i’ refers to the format and ‘t’ to the time,  
X1it   are exogenous, time varying variables, 
X2it   are endogenous, time varying variables,  
Z1i  are exogenous time invariant variables, 
Z2i  are endogenous time invariant variables, 
μi  is the unobserved panel level random effect, 
εit  idiosyncratic error, and  
X2it and Z2i  may be correlated with μi  
                                                 
9 Appropriateness of IV’s was tested using Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978).  
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Since X2it and Z2i may be correlated with μi, the simple random effects estimators are 
unlikely to be consistent for the parameters of the model. The fixed effects estimator 
would on the other hand, in removing μi also remove Z1i and Z2i .  
Equation (1) is GLS transformed to give the Hausman-Taylor equivalent, represented 
below: 
itiiiititit ZZXXY εμββ ))))))) ++∂+∂++= 22112211     (2)  
With itX1
~ , itX 2
~ , iX1
v
, iX 2
v
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MEASURES 
Dependent Variable 
Market Acceptance (MAit): 
 Measure 1- The success of a format and the possibility of it becoming a standard 
 are dependent on the number of products that actually implement it. The first of 
 two measures of success of a format is an indicator of its acceptance in the 
 market. Data was collected on the number of occurrences of the format and the 
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 total number of products reported within the category. Market acceptance 
 measure 1 is denoted by    MA1it, and is a measure of the percentage of products 
 in a product category in a year, that includes or uses the format 
 MA1it = ∑∑ tit PF  
 
 Where  
 
 Fit= No. of times a unique format ‘i’ is observed in time period ‘t’  
    
 Pt= Total No. of products observed in time period ‘t’ 
 
 Measure 2- An alternative indicator of success used in the analysis is the 
 percentage of unique firms that adopt a format to include in their products. The 
 dataset contains data on the number of unique firms which include the format in 
 their products and the number of firms manufacturing digital cameras in a given 
 year. MA2 it  is a measure of the percentage of products in a product category in a 
 year that includes or uses the format 
 MA2it = ∑∑ tit Mf  
 Where  
 
 f = No. of unique firms which include the format ‘i’ in their product in time 
 period ‘t’  
 M = Total No. of firms manufacturing a product in time period ‘t’  
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Independent Variables 
Format Age (Ageit):  Measures the difference between the date of launch of a particular 
model within a given product category and the date of introduction of the format. If a 
format appears in a product, the very year it was launched, the age variable will take a 
value of zero. Product launch dates are available between 1999 and 2007, but since only 
15 days of data were collected from 2007, the year 2007 was dropped from the scope of 
preliminary analysis.   
Standard Setting Alliance Type (Typei): The type of a standard setting alliance is 
determined by the nature of the alliance; specifically, whether it is developed with the 
purpose of developing multiple formats or significant improvements such as the 
Bluetooth forum. Standard setting alliances of this nature have formal governing bodies, 
commonly referred to as committees that govern their functioning. In addition to 
alliances that were clearly identified as being informal based on criteria described below, 
formats developed by single firms were treated as informal alliances. This was based on 
evidence from the popular press indicating that even though the format was developed 
by a single firm, there often are firms that support this alliance early on its life.  
 A formalized alliance would be characterized by announcements and reports 
similar to: 
 
            Hewlett-Packard Co and five other companies involved in CD-
 Recordable/ReWritable technology have announced DVD+RW --a new 
 recordable format. ……Hewlett Packard, Philips Electronics N.V., Sony Corp, 
 Mitsubishi Chemical Corp, Ricoh Co Ltd and Yamaha Corp have now 
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 submitted the open format specification to the ECMA international standards 
 body for review and adoption.   
      -Telecomworldwire, 5th September 1997 
The DVD+RW alliance is considered a formal standard setting alliance in the dataset, in 
light of the following  
1) The alliance is mentioned in press reports or press releases from one of the 
partner firms. 
2) Some firms have been identified as being alliance leaders.  
3) As a group, continues to be active in developing newer versions of the format 
and new formats, as evidenced by press reports. 
4) Press reports also discuss increasing membership to the alliance.  
Correspondingly, the DVD+RW alliance has continuously been involved in formats 
development and standard setting activities, maintains a website discussing the various 
formats it is involved with, and matters of interest to it’s members.  
 
           The DVD+RW Alliance is a voluntary group of industry-leading personal 
 computing manufacturers, optical storage and electronics manufacturers 
 including Dell, Hewlett-Packard Company, MCC/Verbatim, Philips Electronics, 
 Ricoh Company Ltd., Sony Corporation, Thomson multimedia and Yamaha 
 Corporation. The group seeks to develop and promote a universally compatible, 
 rewritable DVD format to enable true convergence between personal computing 
 and consumer electronics products.
    -The DVD+RW alliance  
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 On the contrary, formats launched by an informal alliance, are characterized by 
announcements and reports similar to: 
 
            Epson America Inc. today unveiled its revolutionary PRINT Image matching 
 technology that ensures digital cameras and printers work together perfectly to 
 produce photographs that print truer-to-life than ever before. Several leading 
 digital camera manufacturers — Casio Computer Co. Ltd., Konica Corporation, 
 Kyocera Corporation, Minolta Co. Ltd., Olympus Optical Co. Ltd., Ricoh 
 Company Ltd., Sony Corporation and Toshiba Corporation — will incorporate 
 PRINT Image matching technology in their upcoming digital camera models. 
 Epson will include PRINT Image matching in all future photo printers.
        -Epson Press Release, 2001 
Such alliances are not characterized by  
1) An announcement reported in popular and/or trade press, or by any of the 
individual firms involved.  
2) No alliance leaders have been identified. 
3) No further reports, beyond the announcement of the format, are available, or of 
the firms actively developing new versions of the format. 
4) Other than reports of firms adopting the format (including the format in their 
products), there are no reports of firms partnering with the initial developer.  
Alliance Size (Sizei):  Size indicates the number of firms involved in the alliance at the 
time the development of the format was announced.  
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(Alliance Size)**2 (Size2i): The square of the above variable to test the non linearity.  
Alliance Composition (Compositioni): The data describes the firms participating in the 
alliance and the corresponding format category.  For each alliance in the database, this 
measures the proportion of firms that are active in three or more unique format 
categories (Excluding outliers, the mean number of alliances a firm participates in is 
three). Firms active in more than three formats are classified as generalists and standard 
setting alliances that have a higher proportion of firms participating in multiple format 
categories are classified as generalist standard setting alliances. Firms that are active in a 
single category are classified as specialists and alliances that have a higher proportion of 
firms participating in single a format category are classified as specialist standard setting 
alliances. 
Marketing Intensity (MIi): Measured by selling and general administrative expenses of 
the members of the alliance in the year preceding the announcement of the alliance as a 
percentage of assets. Prior researchers (Mizik and Robertson 2003) have used 
advertising expenses to measure a firms’ focus on value appropriation, and state “One 
key component of value appropriation capability that is of particular concern to 
marketing managers relates to the effects of advertising.” However, the data on 
advertising for the year prior to the alliance announcement is sparse. Therefore, I use a 
measure that is correlated with advertising expenses, namely selling and general 
administrative expenses. The SGA, when reported separately on COMPUSTAT includes 
advertising expenses and marketing expenses10.  
                                                 
10 COMPUSTAT Data Definitions Part II, (LI-Z) (pp.642-643). 
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Format Breadth (Breadthit): The breadth of application of a format is captured by the 
number of product categories it appears in. This is primarily a measure of the possible 
applications of a format.  
 
Controls 
Alliance Size (Allsizeit): Measured as number of employees for all the firms involved in 
the alliance in the year preceding the alliance announcement.  
Selling and General Administrative Expenses (1999-2006) (SGAit): Measured as the sum 
of selling and general administrative expenses of the firms in the alliance as a percentage 
of current assets in the years the format was observed (1999-2006).  
Research and Development Expenses (RDexpit): In examining the marketing capability 
of a firm, R&D expenses and as a consequence, its focus on value creation (Mizik and 
Robertson 2003) is controlled for. R&D expenses are calculated as the sum of R&D 
expenses for the alliance members as a percentage of current assets in the two years prior 
to the announcement of the alliance.  
Competition Measures (Competeit): 
 Total Products in a Category in a Year (Prodcatyrit) - No. of products per 
 category per year observed (as inferred from the number of products listed by 
 Cnet.com).  
 No. of Firms Manufacturing a Product in a Given Year (Firmsmanit) - Count of 
 unique firms that manufacture the product in a given year. 
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 Table 4.3 summarizes the conceptualization of each variable, corresponding 
measure and also presents the source of data.  
 
TABLE 4.3 
Summary of Measures and Data Sources 
Conceptual Variable Measured Variable Data Source 
Dependent Variable 
Market acceptance (Market 
share) 
1. Percentage of products in a category 
at time t that implement the format 
2. Percentage of firms which include the 
format in their product at time t. 
CNet.com 
Independent Variables  
Size of Standard Setting 
Alliance (H1) 
No. of firms in the alliance at the time of 
formation/announcement 
1. Factiva 
2. Lexis-Nexis 
Alliance Composition (H2) Proportion of generalists in the alliance at the time of formation/announcement  
1. Factiva 
2. Lexis-Nexis 
3. Format , 
Alliance and 
Firm 
homepages 
Alliance type (H3) Formal or informal alliance 
1. Factiva 
2. Lexis-Nexis 
3. Format , 
Alliance and 
Firm 
homepages 
Marketing Intensity (H4) 
1. Sum of SGA/Assets for all firms in 
the alliance1 year prior to 
formation/announcement  
2. Sum of SGA/Assets for all firms in 
the alliance 2 year prior to 
formation/announcement  
1. COMPUSTAT 
2. DATASTREAM 
Breadth of Format 
Application (H5) 
No. of product categories in which the 
format is used.  Cnet.com 
Format Age 
Year of announcement of a product 
(using the given format) – Date of 
Alliance announcement. 
1. Factiva 
2. Lexis-Nexis 
3. CNet.com 
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TABLE 4.3 (Continued) 
Conceptual Variable Measured Variable Data Source 
Control variables   
Firm & Alliance Size 
1. No. of employees in the 
alliance 1 year prior to 
formation/announcement 
2. No. of employees in the 
alliance 2 years prior to 
formation/announcement 
1. COMPUSTAT 
2. DATASTREAM 
Competition within a product 
category 
1. No. of products per category. 
2. No. of firms manufacturing 
the format. 
Cnet.com 
Selling and general 
administrative expenses over 
the period of observation 
Sum of SGA/Assets from 1999-
2006 for all firms in the alliance. 
1. COMPUSTAT 
2. DATASTREAM 
Research and Development 
Expenses 
Sum of R&D expenses/ Assets 
for all the firms in the alliance 2 
years prior to the announcement 
1. COMPUSTAT 
2. DATASTREAM 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
 
 Table 5.1 presents the correlation matrix for the data. Table 5.2 presents the 
results from the estimated models. Model 1 uses the percentage of products in a category 
in a year including the format, as the measure of market acceptance. Model 2 uses the 
percentage of unique firms which include the format in their product, as the measure of 
market acceptance.  
Hypothesis 1 argues that the relationship between the number of members in the 
initial alliance and the market acceptance of the format is ‘U’ shaped. This hypothesis is 
supported by both models, as indicated by the positive and significant value of the linear 
term and negative and significant value of the quadratic term. An increase in the number 
of firms backing a format (size of an alliance) is associated with an increase in the 
market acceptance of the format up to a point, beyond which, market acceptance shows a 
decline with the size of the alliance. This result is contrary to the   Axelrod et al. (1995). 
Their model, based on the assumption that that the utility of firms joining a particular 
standard setting alliance increases with the size of the alliance was successful in 
predicting alliance membership, thereby giving support to the afore mentioned 
assumption. The results presented here are consistently strong across models and across 
various combinations of independent variables. I do not predict an optimal number of 
members, since different alliances are likely to perform well at varying levels of 
membership and under varying circumstances.
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TABLE 5.1 
 
Correlations
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. M  A1 1                  
2. MA2 .914 1                 
3. Composition -.076 -.063 1                
4. Age .220 .228 .094 1               
5. Type .113 .116 .152 .021 1              
6. Size .271 .284 -.361 -.069 .220 1             
7. ( Size )**2 .197 .211 -.340 -.061 .116 .960 1            
8.  Firmsman -.183 -.146 -.047 .086 -.061 -.098 -.098 1           
9.  Prodcatyr -.138 -.050 -.023 .097 -.052 -.055 -.060 .790 1          
10. Breadth .311 .272 -.143 -.05 .213 .237 .131 -.033 -.033 1         
11. Breadth*age .327 .318 -.001 .785 .173 .129 .063 .035 .056 .473 1        
12. AllSize1 -.015 .004 .286 -.261 .147 .259 .220 -.107 -.053 .307 -.037 1       
13.  AllSize2 -.031 -.012 .300 -.269 .134 .216 .185 -.096 -.048 .285 -.066 .996 1      
14. MI2 -.068 -.041 -.088 .433 -.185 -.222 -.226 .003 .013 -.120 .278 -.345 -.355 1     
15. RDexp2 .007 .009 .126 .456 -.141 -.237 -.248 .010 .015 -.163 .274 -.249 -.26 .784 1    
16. MI1 .099 -.065 -.264 .241 .053 -.070 -.102 .082 .072 -.094 .111 -.386 -.381 .659 .477 1   
17. RDexp1 -.086 -.067 -.123 .181 .168 .003 -.061 .071 .074 -.055 .109 -.239 -.239 .400 .548 .830 1  
18. SGA -.211 -.218 .233 -.295 -.284 -.058 -.040 -.080 -.039 .002 -.210 .399 .399 -.234 -.181 -.413 -.326 1 
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TABLE 5.2 
Market Acceptance: Effect of Alliance, Partner and Format Characteristics 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent measures Market Acceptance 1 
Market 
Acceptance 2 
Variables of Interest   
(No. of members) 19.408*** 27.186*** 
(No. of members)**2  -1.290*** -2.013*** 
Alliance Composition  46.756*** 58.617*** 
Alliance Type -4.902 -6.117 
Marketing Intensity (SGA)– 1 year 
prior  212.338*** 195.695** 
Marketing Intensity (SGA) – 2 
years prior -130.306** -118.481* 
Format Breadth 10.090** 11.620** 
Age -.018 1.673* 
Format Breadth*Age .311 -.087 
Controls   
SGA expenses over the period of 
observation (1999-2006) 5.874 22.484 
Employees – 1 year prior  
(Alliance Size) .931* 1.116* 
Employees – 2 years prior 
(Alliance Size) -1.112* -1.291* 
R&D Intensity – 1 year prior -686.743** -693.906* 
R&D Intensity – 2 years prior 525.170** 571.016* 
No. of Firms Manufacturing a 
product in a given year -.379 _______ 
Total products in a category in a 
year _______ .028** 
N 334 339 
 
  * Significant at .1 level 
  ** Significant at .05 level 
  ***Significant at .01 level 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 argues that a format developed by alliances with a greater 
proportion of generalist firms will lead to greater market acceptance. This hypothesis is 
supported and the result is consistent with prior research on product line breadth (e.g. 
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Robinson and Fornell 1985; Kekre and Srinivasan 1990), which has shown a positive 
relationship between product line breadth and market share. 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that formats developed by formalized alliances will be 
more successful. While prior research has demonstrated that formalized alliances tend to 
perform better, the results from my data do not lend support for this hypothesis. The 
coefficient estimate, while negative in all models, is not significant. Nonetheless, this 
presents an interesting result because the lack of an effect in either direction could be 
because of the fact that formats developed by alliances without a formalized structure 
may still be able to develop formats that fill a niche, and thereby find firms willing to 
adopt it. On the other hand, it could also be that one or more firms involved in the 
alliance are dominant in certain product categories and have sufficient market share in 
the product category that their introducing the format in their product can generate 
preliminary sales to generate initial externalities that convince other firms to adopt and 
develop related products. Cases in point are firms such as Microsoft and Apple, which 
owing to their size and influence in the industry have been tremendously successful in 
launching new formats in the market despite not being involved in alliances. Effects to 
this extent have been proven by Farrell and Saloner (1986), who show that dominant 
firms have been single handedly capable of developing and commercializing successful 
formats. I find some support for this possibility by the significant effect of the alliance 
size variable.  
Most of the literature that has studied formal and informal alliances, and 
discussed earlier, have looked at the role of formality from the perspectives of learning, 
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risk and trust. While I use the existing literature to argue for the positive effect of formal 
alliances on market acceptance, to my best knowledge, there has been no literature that 
directly examines market based outcomes. The findings of this paper may not be 
therefore contradictory to prior research. I do however recognize that there are possibly 
more complex interrelationships between variables. The coefficients discussed are 
therefore possibly marginal effects that do not flow through other variables not 
considered here. Makhija and Ganesh (1997) for instance control for power asymmetry 
and partner need, which I do not account for. There could undoubtedly be relationships 
between the formality of alliance and power asymmetry, which goes un-captured.  
Hypothesis 4 argues that formats developed and promoted by alliances with 
greater marketing intensity will gain greater market acceptance. Marketing intensity was 
significant in both models 1 and 2. Marketing intensity was measured for both 1 year 
and 2 years prior to the formation of the alliance, indicating that past marketing intensity 
is an important criterion for alliance members. Correspondingly, R&D intensity for 1 
and 2 years prior to the announcement of the alliance is significant.  
However the marketing intensity during the period of observation measured as 
selling and general administrative expenses proves to be not significant. This suggests 
that while marketing intensity is related to greater market acceptance in the early stages 
of the alliance, and firms spend more on marketing and commercializing the format, 
once the format gets established, marketing intensity is not a significant predictor of 
greater market acceptance. This could be due to the fact that in the early stages, firms 
look towards alliances that have the ability to take a format toward a tipping point or 
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firms that are able to sell products using the format. Beyond this initial stage, direct and 
indirect network externalities take over, and are of greater importance in predicting 
format success.  
To gain a better understanding of the role of marketing intensity in the market 
acceptance of a format, I proceed to run a post hoc analysis comparing marketing 
intensity against R&D intensity in the early stages of the alliance. To this extent, I follow 
Mizik and Jacobson (2003), and measure the strategic emphasis of the firms, strategic 
emphasis being measured as  
SEit = (SGA Expenditures-R&D Expenditures)/Assets. 
Mizik and Jacobson (2003) use advertising expenses, rather than SGA expenses, but 
since, as discussed earlier, data on advertising expenses, was sparse and since SGA is 
correlated with advertising expenses, I use SGA to compute the strategic emphasis of the 
alliance developing format ‘i’ in time period ‘t’.  
 The results indicated that when MA1 (the percentage of products using a format) 
was used as the dependent variable, marketing and R&D intensity were substituted by 
the strategic emphasis variable, strategic emphasis of a firm one year prior to the 
formation of the alliance, was positive and significant. The strategic emphasis variable is 
not significant in two years prior to the alliance formation. This is interesting because, it 
provides some indication as to the role of a strategic emphasis on marketing, one year 
prior to the alliance formation. Since this is a post hoc analysis, and the results hold only 
in one of the two models, the results are not discussed in greater detail.  
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  Hypothesis 5 states that a format with greater breadth of application is likely to 
lead to greater market acceptance. I find support for this argument. However, as 
discussed in Chapter III, the question of whether products that survive in the market for 
longer periods of time, are likely to be adopted more widely and hence find greater 
acceptance in the market has often been contested in the literature. This is the case since 
it has also been argued in literature that as products exist in the market, newer 
technologies, and products are likely to replace the older ones. I therefore test the effect 
of both format age and the interaction between format age and format breadth, both of 
which I find to be not significant. This implies that format age, or the time for which the 
format has been available on the market is not a predictor of the breadth of applicability, 
and therefore of market acceptance.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND  
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
While much of the past work on standard setting alliances has been theoretical, 
the unique nature of the data used in this research allows empirical examination of the 
success of formats and its relationship to the initial supporters. While there is a general 
understanding of the role of the traditional standard setting organization (IEEE, IEEECS, 
ISO, ITU etc.) in standard setting, and while we know the reasons for the shift to 
standard setting alliances, we know much less about the characteristics of the alliances 
and the participants in these alliances that are conducive to the successful development 
of the format. Against this backdrop, the primary theoretical contribution of this research 
is that it addresses this research void and enhances our understanding of the relationship 
between standard setting alliances and the success of a format in the market.  
The theoretical framework used in this dissertation relies, to a large extent, on the 
network theory literature, which suggests that the initial conditions of any network 
market are critical to the success of the product. The context of this research allows me 
to test some of the initial conditions of a network (such as the effects of network size, 
composition, type and marketing and R&D assets) on its future success. There have been 
numerous calls from various quarters for more research on the evolution of technologies 
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(e.g. the Mack Center for Technology Innovation at Wharton and Tellis 2008). This 
research addresses this call.   
Further, while much of marketing, management and economics literature has 
focused on the dyadic form of alliances, multi-firm alliances are an under researched 
topic. I address these gaps by building on extant research in the new product alliance and 
networks literature by observing the market outcomes over a time for a unique form of 
alliances.  
For managers, this research first addresses the fundamental issue of alliance 
choice in format development. The results give some guidelines as to what types of 
standard setting alliances to support in the early stages and what characteristics to look 
for in the format. The results offer suggestions for the type of development stage 
alliances that firms can possibly join. While after development, a larger and growing 
standard setting alliance is better for the growth and spread of the format owing to 
network effects, there is uncertainty regarding the question of whether a small or a large 
alliance is better during the development stage. In addition, the results suggest that even 
for firms that operate in a limited number of industries, focusing on formats that may 
have applications in other industries could be potentially beneficial in terms of success 
of the format.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
Standard setting alliances, format development and standard setting are detailed 
processes with numerous intricate details that determine their success. This research 
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addresses but only a few of these. Empirical testing of a more comprehensive model is 
constrained by non availability data on multiple formats and their corresponding 
alliances.  
Consideration of a larger set of variables such as the investments that individual 
firms make in the alliance, their role in the alliance, and the terms of the alliance, such as 
the intellectual property rights (Lemley 2002) can further enhance our understanding of 
the underlying processes. The outcome of standard setting processes is determined to a 
large extend, by the licensing practices of the firms that control the format. These 
practices are not accounted for here and hence a limitation. Some of the results, as 
discussed could therefore be marginal, in the fact that there may be more complex 
interrelationships between variables that are as yet unaccounted for in the model.   
In addition, a more comprehensive database of formats per product model would 
greatly improve the quality of the results. Such a database can however be put together 
only by using more sophisticated programs designed to assemble data from a wider 
variety of sources.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Future research would ideally be able to move beyond observing the initial stage 
of the alliances, and observe different stages of the alliances. While such data on dyads 
in the pharmaceutical-biotech industries is available from commercial sources, different 
stages in larger alliances are either not reported or tracking them over time is a tedious 
and time intensive task. In addition, future research could also examine whether and how 
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firms assess prospects in standards markets. This would have direct implications for the 
choice of partners and alliances.  
Another limitation of this research is that due to the non availability of data, the 
dataset used in the analysis is unbalanced. A more complete data set that covers all the 
years in question for all formats can present a balanced panel yielding better estimates. 
While such a dataset can be assembled, it would, as previously discussed, require the use 
of more sophisticated programming techniques and greater computing power.  
Finally, this research focuses only on the formats developed within the consumer 
electronics industry. While the consumer electronics industry was chosen in light of both 
the prevalence of standard setting alliances and extensive standardization activities, 
standard setting is also prevalent in industries as diverse as aeronautics, construction, e-
commerce, real estate and telecom. Future research could therefore potentially be 
extended to include these other industries.   
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